Climate Change:
Government, Private Property, and Individual Action by Babie, Paul
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 11
Issue 2 Winter 2011: Climate Law Reporter Article 7
Climate Change: Government, Private Property,
and Individual Action
Paul Babie
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Babie, Paul. "Climate Change: Government, Private Property, and Individual Action." Sustainable Development Law & Policy 11, no. 2
(2011): 19-21, 77-78.
SuStainable Development law & policy19
InTroducTIon
Climate change is a private property problem. Some may react strongly to such a bold claim—after all, private property is seen as a solution to the crisis, as 
illustrated by the current fascination with the “commodifica-
tion”1 and “propertization”2 of carbon through “cap-and-trade”3 
schemes.4 Notwithstanding the current fashionability of legisla-
tive responses to climate change, in the last year governments 
seem to be backing away from taking bold action.
In late 2009, the United Nations climate talks in Copenha-
gen failed to produce a successor agreement to the Kyoto Proto-
col5—participants opted instead for a weak political agreement.6 
Throughout 2010, this compounded the inability of national gov-
ernments, especially those of the major developed nations such 
as the United States7 and Australia,8 to mitigate greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions through “cap-and-trade” legislation aimed 
at permitting the purchase and sale of rights to emit GHG.9 Gov-
ernments let their initiatives lapse.10 Some more cynical might 
say the failure of Copenhagen galvanized the resolve of such 
governments to oppose mitigating legislation of any kind.11 
Finally, at the end of 2010, the Cancún UN climate talks, rather 
than focusing on mitigation through binding political agreement, 
issued a set of agreements, a major portion of which aims at 
adaptation to the changes wrought by the un-mitigated emission 
of GHG.12
As matters currently stand, as of January 1, 2013, the day 
Kyoto expires, the world will have no binding limits on GHG.13 
For many,14 this fact causes real alarm. And it ought to, for this 
governmental failure stands as a depressing indictment of the 
effects on people of anthropogenic climate change. Bjørn Lom-
borg, the self-proclaimed “skeptical environmentalist,”15 puts it 
this way:
The risks of unchecked global warming are now widely 
acknowledged: a rise in sea levels threatening the exis-
tence of some low-lying coastal communities; pres-
sure on freshwater resources, making food production 
more difficult in some countries and possibly becom-
ing a source of societal conflict; changing weather pat-
terns providing favorable conditions for the spread of 
malaria. To make matters worse, the effects will be felt 
most in those parts of the world which are home to the 
poorest people who are least able to protect themselves 
and who bear the least responsibility for the build-up 
of greenhouse gases . . . . Concern has been great, but 
humanity has so far done very little that will actually 
prevent these outcomes. Carbon emissions have kept 
increasing, despite repeated promises of cuts.16
Another way of looking at humanity’s inaction may simply 
be the recognition, by governments if not yet by humanity as 
a whole, that what is necessary is nothing short of wholesale 
change to the dominant concept of private property. This brief 
essay aims to explain why private property, touted as recently as 
last year as the saviour to the challenge posed by climate change, 
may in fact be the source of the problem and why we need to 
take individual, personal action rather than wait for governments 
to act for us.
whaT prIvaTe properTy Is
We begin with liberal theory, from which the dominant 
contemporary concept of private property emerges.17 Liberal-
ism concerns itself with the establishment and maintenance of 
a political and legal order which, among other things, secures 
individual freedom in choosing a “life project”—the values and 
ends of a preferred way of life.18 In order for life to have mean-
ing, some control over the use of goods and resources is nec-
essary; private property is liberalism’s means of ensuring that 
individuals enjoy choice over goods and resources so as to allow 
them to fulfill their life project.19
In simple terms, the liberal conception of private property is 
a “bundle” of legal relations (or rights) created, conferred, and 
enforced by the state (through law) between people in relation 
to the control of goods and resources.20 At a minimum, these 
rights typically include use, exclusivity, and disposition.21 One 
can use one’s car (or, with few exceptions, any other tangible or 
intangible good, resource, or item of social wealth), for exam-
ple, to the exclusion of all others, and may dispose of it. The 
holder may exercise these rights in any way to satisfy personal 
preferences and desires.22 Alternatively, crafting this in a way 
that comports with the language of liberal theory—rights are the 
shorthand way of saying that individuals enjoy choice about the 
control and use of goods and resources in accordance with and 
to give meaning to a chosen life project.
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Notice, though, that in this definition, such rights exist only 
as a product of relationship between individuals. This is signifi-
cant, for it focuses our attention on the fact that where there is a 
right (choice) to do something, there is a corresponding duty (a 
lack of choice) to refrain from interfering with the interest pro-
tected by the right.23 Rights would clearly be meaningless if this 
were not so. As concerns a particular good or resource, then, the 
liberal individual holds choice, while all others (the community, 
society) are burdened with a lack of it. C. Edwin Baker sum-
marizes the idea of rights and relationship this way: “[private] 
property [i]s a claim that other people ought to accede to the 
will of the owner, which can be a person, a group, or some other 
entity. A specific property right amounts to the decisionmaking 
authority of the holder of that right.”24
Private property, then, is not merely about the control and 
use of goods and resources, but also significantly about control-
ling the lives of others.25 Using evocative and graphic language, 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger puts it this way:
[t]he right [choice] is a loaded gun that the rightholder 
[the holder of choice] may shoot at will in his corner 
of town. Outside that corner the other licensed gunmen 
may shoot him down. But the give-and-take of com-
munal life and its characteristic concern for the actual 
effect of any decision upon the other person are incom-
patible with this view of right . . . .26
Identifying the importance of relationship reveals the fact 
that private property and non-property rights overlap; choices 
made by those with the former have the potential to create nega-
tive outcomes—consequences, or what economists call “exter-
nalities”—for those with the latter.27 At the highest level of 
generality, Unger’s “gunman” is vested with absolute discretion 
to “an absolute claim to a divisible portion of social capital[]” 
and that “[i]n this zone the rightholder [can] avoid any tangle 
of claims to mutual responsibility.”28 The individual revels in 
“a zone of unchecked discretionary action that others, whether 
private citizens or governmental officials, may not invade.”29
Every legal system acknowledges this problem and, in doing 
so, seems to accept that with rights come obligations towards 
others.30 The state, through law, creates private property, just 
as through that same law (what is more commonly known as 
regulation), it is said to mediate the socially contingent bound-
ary between private property and non-property holders. This is, 
in fact, the essence of private property—state conferral of self-
serving rights that come with obligations towards others.31
Yet there is something much more disturbing lurking just 
below the surface of what appears to be state control aimed 
at preventing harmful outcomes like those of climate change. 
What is really being conferred by private property is what Dun-
can Kennedy calls the legal ground rules giving “permissions to 
injure” others, to cause legalised injury.32 This is insidious, for 
“we don’t think of [them] as ground rules at all, by contrast with 
ground rules of prohibition. This is Wesley Hohfeld’s insight: 
the legal order permits as well as prohibits, in the simple-minded 
sense that it could prohibit, but judges and legislators reject 
demands from those injured that the injurers be restrained.”33 
And they are invisible, in the sense, that
when lawmakers do nothing, they appear to have noth-
ing to do with the outcome. But when one thinks that 
many other forms of injury are prohibited, it becomes 
clear that inaction is a policy, and that law is respon-
sible for the outcome, at least in the abstract sense that 
the law could have made it otherwise . . . . It is clear 
that lawmakers could require almost anything. When 
they require nothing, it looks as though the law is unin-
volved in the situation, though the legal decision not to 
impose a duty is in another sense the cause of the out-
come when one person is allowed to ignore another’s 
plight.34
This brings us full circle to the broader liberal theory with 
which we began, for the importance of relationship in under-
standing private property reveals an important, yet paradoxical, 
dimension of choice. It is simply this: the freedom that liberal-
ism secures to the individual to choose a life project means that 
in the course of doing that, the individual also chooses the laws, 
relationships, communities, and so forth that constitute the polit-
ical and legal order. In other words, in the province of politics 
people choose their contexts (through electing representatives, 
who enact laws and appoint judges who interpret those laws), 
which in turn defines the scope of one’s rights—choice, deci-
sionmaking authority—and the institutions that confer, protect 
and enforce it (bearing in mind the ground rules of permission 
as well as the ground rules of prohibition). Individuals as much 
choose the regulation of property as they do the control and use 
of goods and resources.35
how prIvaTe properTy FacIlITaTes The 
exTernalITIes oF clImaTe chanGe
When we focus on relationship as central to private prop-
erty and the political-regulatory contexts we choose, we begin to 
see something else that was always there, although it was hidden 
from our view. The externalities of private property create many 
other types of relationship in which the lives of many are con-
trolled by the choices of a few.36 Anthropogenic climate change 
is a stark example.
While the science is complex, it is clear enough that humans, 
through their choices, produce the GHG that enhance the natu-
ral greenhouse effect, which heats the earth’s surface.37 Among 
other effects, anthropogenic climate change results in drought 
and desertification, increased extreme weather events, and the 
melting of polar ice (especially in the north) and so rising seas 
levels.38 We might call this the “climate change relationship.” 
Private property, as a concept, facilitates choice (both human 
and corporate) about the use of goods and resources in such a 
way that emits greenhouse gases.39
Our choices about goods and resources cover the gamut of 
our chosen life projects: where we live, what we do there, how 
we travel from place to place and so forth. Corporate choices are 
equally important, for they structure the range of choice avail-
able to individuals in setting their own agendas, thus giving 
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corporations the power to broaden or restrict the meaning of pri-
vate property in the hands of individuals.40 Green energy (solar 
or wind power), for instance, remains unavailable to the indi-
vidual consumer if no corporate energy provider is willing to 
produce it.41
Externalities do not end at the borders, physical or legal, 
of a good or resource; choices occur within a web of relation-
ships, not only legal and social, but also physical and spatial. 
Who is affected? Everyone, the world over, is affected, with the 
poor and disadvantaged of the developing world disproportion-
ately bearing the brunt of the human consequences of climate 
change42—decreasing security, shortages of food, increased 
health problems, and greater stress on available water supplies. 
Indeed, as Jedediah Purdy argues,
[c]limate change threatens to become, fairly literally, 
the externality that ate the world. The last two hundred 
years of economic growth have been not just a prefer-
ence-satisfaction machine but an externality machine, 
churning out greenhouse gases that cost polluters noth-
ing and disperse through the atmosphere to affect the 
whole globe.43
Consider human security. It will decrease both within coun-
tries affected directly by climate change, and in those countries 
indirectly affected through the movement of large numbers of 
people displaced by the direct effects of climate change in their 
own countries.44 In the case of rising sea levels, for instance, 
sixty percent of the human population lives within one hun-
dred kilometers of the ocean, with the majority in small- and 
medium-sized settlements on land no more than five meters 
above sea level.45 Even the modest sea level rises predicted for 
these places will result in a massive displacement of “climate” 
or “environmental refugees.”46 Private property, by secur-
ing choice about the use of goods and resources to those in the 
developed world, makes all of this possible.
conclusIon: Is IT The soluTIon?
Nonetheless, private property and the commodification 
upon which it depends seem to be in vogue at the moment as a 
solution to anthropogenic climate change. Creating a proprietary 
interest in carbon that can be bought and sold is the answer—is 
the political choice, it is claimed and we believe—to the climate 
crisis. Is it really? We could just as easily say that the concept 
of private property is the primary culprit. Is it wise to entrust 
the solution to the concept that put us here? Or might it be more 
appropriate, as Mike Hulme suggests, to “see how we can use 
the idea of climate change—the matrix of ecological functions, 
power relationships, cultural discourses and material flows 
that climate change reveals—to rethink how we take forward 
our political, social, economic, and personal projects over the 
decades to come.”47
Before we pin our hopes on it as a cure-all, we might ask 
first whether the liberal concept of private property is ripe for 
just such a reappraisal. We can choose, but we must do so with 
our eyes open to the reality: that private property and the con-
texts in which we live are in fact our choice, not that of gov-
ernments. We can no longer wait for government to act, with 
cap-and-trade schemes or any other form of regulation. At the 
very least, it is not enough, and at worst, it will take too long. 
Now is the time to act. And only we can take action. In exercis-
ing choice about our context and about goods and resources, we 
must take responsibility for ourselves, rather than waiting for 
our governments to act for us.48
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